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5Pierre Werner
A Visionary European and Consensus Builder
Elena Danescu
Inherently attached to the European idea—and what Luxembourger
wouldn’t be?—I believe that during my career I remained equidistant
from Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans. It might be said that a measured,
constructive optimism was my most valuable contribution to European
progress. (Werner 1992, II: 171)
Pierre Werner (1913–2002) was an economist and a lawyer, a politician and a
diplomat, and a leading player in the building of a united Europe, in particular
in monetary integration. As prime minister and ﬁnance minister of Luxem-
bourg for several decades, this prominent Christian Democratic intellectual
and committed federalist was one of the rare statesmen who was associated
with all the major issues in European integration from the Schuman Plan of
1950 to the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984. He placed the European
integration process at the centre of Luxembourg policy, convinced of the need
to preserve national sovereignty by adopting an international outlook.
Werner played a major role in regional integration, notably in the Belgium–
Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) and in Benelux, and in European
Economic Community (EEC) policy-making. He gained a strong reputation
for his skills in forging a political consensus between larger powers, above all
Germany and France, and between diametrically opposed positions on mon-
etary integration, principally between the ‘economists’ and the ‘monetarists’.
In this way he succeeded in defending Luxembourg’s vital interests, from the
steel industry to the seats of the European institutions and the promotion of its
ﬁnancial centre.
Werner was involved in the major intellectual debates of his time and in the
efforts to establish transnational guidelines and consensus on monetary mat-
ters. He was an early activist for a common European currency, both for
ofﬁcial usage, to help bring national policies closer together, and for private
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usage as a banking instrument. Although he was initially in favour of a
‘monetarist’ approach to European integration, he was one of the ﬁrst to
develop arguments for a symmetrical Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). The careful balance that he sought reappeared in the Werner Report
of 1970, which was offered as the ofﬁcial blueprint for EMU in the European
Union (EU). Werner’s claims to be an architect of EMU are threefold: his
intellectual contribution to goal-setting, his effective political negotiation
methods, and his consensus-building skills.
Based on the previously unpublished Werner family archives and on an
extensive selection of original interviews, this chapter examines PierreWerner’s
work in favour of EMU and reveals his role as an architect of this process. The
ﬁrst part focuses on Werner’s intellectual background and European commit-
ment. The second looks at his monetary thinking and political action in the
1960s. The third section considers the Werner Report and Werner’s personal
contribution as chair to its work in terms of both substance—a parallel
approach, a balanced ﬁnal outcome, and the external dimension of EMU—and
the forging of a political consensus. The ﬁnal part assesses his legacy.
WERNER ’S INTELLECTUAL AND
CAREER BACKGROUND
Werner was born of Luxembourgish parents in Saint-André near Lille, France,
on 29 December 1913. In 1934 he enrolled in the higher preparatory course in
law in Luxembourg. As his country did not have a university, he continued his
studies at the Faculty of Law in Paris, where he also attended courses at the
École libre des sciences politiques. In January 1938 he completed his PhD in
Law and prepared to embark on a career as a lawyer.
From early on, Werner was an active member of the Association of Catholic
University Students, which he chaired from 1935 to 1937. In 1937 he became
vice-president of the International Movement of Catholic Intellectuals (Pax
Romana). During his time in Paris he lived at the Biermans-Lapôtre Founda-
tion, whose alumni included many members of the Luxembourg elite. In this
periodWerner joined the European ranks of Catholic thinkers. Inspired by the
theologian Robert Picard de la Vacquerie, he began to take an interest in the
‘authentic Christian politics’ advocated by Jacques Maritain, whose inﬂuential
political theory was one of the main bases for the Christian Democratic
movement. Werner also became deeply involved in the work carried out
by Robert Garric’s ‘social teams’ (Équipes sociales). From that time on,
the principles of social Catholicism strongly characterized his political and
social approach.
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During his studies, Werner was particularly interested in public and private
ﬁnance, forging useful links with his teachers Jacques Rueff and Wilfrid
Baumgartner, both inﬂuential French ﬁnance ofﬁcials, as well as with Charles
Rist, deputy governor of the Banque de France. They inﬂuenced his intellec-
tual development and stimulated his curiosity for the study of economic and
monetary questions. In Paris, he met another Luxembourg native, Robert
Schuman, a member of the French National Assembly, who tried to whet
his appetite for politics and who was to become an iconic ﬁgure in the launch
of post-war European integration.
As a young lawyer at the Luxembourg bar, in 1938 Werner was awarded an
internship at the Banque Générale de Luxembourg (BGL), in which the
Deutsche Bank (DB) had taken a major holding. He escaped Nazi persecution
thanks to Hermann Abs, chairman of the board and appointed by the
Deutsche Bank. Abs’ benevolent attitudes helped protect those who, like
Werner, refused to join Nazi organizations. Werner’s family was not, however,
spared by the war. Pierre’s younger brother was forcibly conscripted for
‘labour service’ (Arbeitsdienst) and died at a labour camp in eastern Prussia
on 15 January 1945. Werner’s work in the secretariat of the BGL prompted
him to write a report on the monetary, ﬁnancial, and banking situation in
Luxembourg in 1942. He managed to send the report to the Luxembourg
government in exile in London through the Martin network of the French
Resistance.
At the Liberation, Werner became an attaché in the ﬁnance ministry. In
1945, he was tasked with carrying out a study of the reorganization of the
banking system in Luxembourg. Subsequently he was appointed banking
commissioner. In this capacity he was involved in the creation of an authority
to organize and regulate the credit market and contributed to the establish-
ment of international ﬁnancial relations. He was associated with the oper-
ations for the reintroduction of the franc, the reﬂoating of banking activities,
and the re-establishment of the main Luxembourg state bank, the Banque et
Caisse d’Épargne de l’État. He represented Luxembourg in international
negotiations, particularly in Switzerland and within the BLEU and the
Benelux. As adviser to Prime Minister Pierre Dupong on ﬁnancial affairs,
Werner also took part in multilateral dealings relating to defence, including
NATO, the abortive European Defence Community (EDC), and the Western
European Union (WEU). At a very early stage he became familiar with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1947, with the support of Ambassador
Hugues Le Gallais, he successfully negotiated a loan of $12.7 million from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) for the
reconstruction of Luxembourg.1
1 Telegram from Pierre Werner to Pierre Dupong (New York, 22 July 1947). Archives
Nationales de Luxembourg (Luxembourg National Archives) (ANLux)/AE-09283.
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Werner worked closely with the Luxembourg prime minister, who was
increasingly of the view that this competent, meticulous expert was the
best man to assume the functions of ﬁnance minister. This promotion duly
came about in December 1953, when Werner was asked to join the new
cabinet set up by Joseph Bech, following Dupong’s untimely death.
After the 1959 elections, Werner became prime minister. For twenty years—
from 1959 to 1974 and from 1979 to 1984—he directed the coalition cabinets
that the Christian Social Party (CSV) formed with either the liberal party or the
socialist party. His role as president of the government was combined with
other ministerial portfolios in what were seen as priority areas for a country
that was constantly innovating and developing. He served as minister for
ﬁnance (1959–64 and 1969–74), for the Treasury (1964–9 and 1979–84), for
foreign affairs and justice (1964–7), as well as for the civil service (1967–9) and
for cultural affairs (1969–74 and 1979–84).
As ﬁnance minister, Werner turned his attention to major projects with a
view to making Luxembourg a forward-looking country and a true inter-
national platform. The development programme for the ‘European quarter’
on the Kirchberg (1961) was a major trump card in the country’s hand during
the ‘battle for the seats’ in 1965. He worked hard to diversify the economy,
especially focusing on consolidating Luxembourg’s transformation from a
banking centre to an international ﬁnancial centre from the 1960s onwards,
nurturing the idea for a Luxembourg shipping ﬂag, developing the audiovisual
sector, and, in particular, setting up the satellite project.
For the 1974–9 parliamentary term, the CSV went into opposition and
Werner was chair of his party’s parliamentary group. He encouraged the CSV
to pursue an approach inspired by the British tradition of ‘Her Majesty’s loyal
opposition’, which enabled it to play a constructive role in the consensus-
based management of the steel crisis. One of the results was the establishment
of the ‘steel tripartite’ (an institutionalized platform for dialogue between the
government, employers, and employees), which subsequently became the
Luxembourg model for social consultation.
The new Werner government took ofﬁce in 1979 and worked to ensure a
smooth post-industrial transition for Luxembourg. It successfully overcame
the unrest in the BLEU and for the ﬁrst time laid down Luxembourg’s
monetary status in a comprehensive, coherent way. Werner took measures
to transform his party and brought Jean-Claude Juncker, aged just twenty-
eight, into the government as state secretary for labour affairs. In July 1984,
when his party again won the general election, Werner passed the baton to his
long-time fellow-worker Jacques Santer and withdrew from political life. He
remained active in public affairs, particularly focusing his energies on the
promotion of EMU and the euro, notably as joint chair, alongside Raymond
Barre, of the Lyon-based ECU Institute, a think-tank composed of inter-
national economic and ﬁnancial experts that was set up in 1992 to promote
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the European currency. He also retained an active interest in the development
of the media and the audiovisual sector, especially through the project for the
Société Européenne des Satellites (SES). Werner passed away on 24 June 2002
in Luxembourg City.
A COMMITTED EUROPEAN
Werner had been aware of the importance of European issues since his
university days. However, his commitment to European uniﬁcation took
ﬁrm shape in 1949, when he became convinced of the urgent need for the
countries of Western Europe to undertake the economic and political con-
struction of a united Europe. His experience of working in the international
arena, ‘particularly his awareness of the weakness and the divided state of
Europe, made it almost an intellectual obligation’ (Werner 1992, I: 34–5).
As a Luxembourger, Werner was naturally attached to the European idea. It
offered a response to Luxembourg’s main aspirations, which were linked to its
speciﬁc geopolitical status as a small, multicultural, multilingual nation, sand-
wiched between two larger powers, France and Germany, as well as to its
economic situation, which included a lack of natural resources, no central
bank, and no national currency. The European principle of equality among
states also guaranteed Luxembourg a role in decision-making and in the
leadership of European organizations. By giving up part of its sovereignty—
which it had already shown it was prepared to do in the monetary ﬁeld as a
member of the BLEU—Luxembourg has, paradoxically, actually strengthened
its sovereignty. Thanks to its ‘mastery of small-state diplomacy’ within the
context of European integration, Luxembourg took on the role of mediator
between larger powers and simultaneously succeeded in defending its vital
interests, from the steel industry to the seats of the European institutions and
its ﬁnancial centre (Dyson 2015).
Werner was associated from the very outset with the major issues relating to
European integration. He made a signiﬁcant contribution to shaping the
outcome of the battle over the political seats of the European institutions
and to the choice of Luxembourg ﬁrstly as the workplace of the institutions in
1965, then as one of their permanent capitals; he also played a major role in
the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966 which ended the French ‘empty-chair’
policy and, not least, in the Werner Report of 1970.
The ‘Luxembourg Compromise’, which had been based on a Benelux
strategy of mediation, encouraged the idea that Werner might one day stand
for the role of president of the European Commission. However, it remained
no more than a rumour, as he never really considered giving up his national
electoral mandate. In the mid-1960s, in his efforts to afﬁrm Luxembourg’s
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position of leadership on the international stage, Werner was involved, along-
side Pierre Pescatore, general secretary of the foreign ministry, in organizing
an independent diplomatic service, based on national intellectual elites and
continuing the work begun by Joseph Bech at the dawn of the Second
World War.
From 1960 to 1974 and in 1980 the Luxembourg presidencies of the EEC
Council were held exclusively by various Werner governments in succession.
He adopted an approach which he saw in theoretical terms as a method for
any fruitful presidency:
I regarded my presidency as an opportunity, primarily, for creating an atmos-
phere and a climate of negotiation which took account of the delicate sensitivities
of partners aspiring to reach agreement. The agreement must not leave any losers
in a squabble over minutiae of language which may disguise a persistent under-
lying disagreement. (Werner 1992, II: 79)
Werner’s longevity in power and his European commitment enabled him to
forge lasting relationships with many eminent ﬁgures and to be involved in
various transnational governance networks, communities of experts, and
inﬂuential groups. He also took an active role, alongside Jean Monnet and
Robert Trifﬁn, in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe
(ACUSE) and the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC).
Together with Jacques Santer, Werner also played a part in the establishment
of the European People’s Party (EPP), which was founded on 8 July 1976 in
Luxembourg. He wrote the economic and social chapters of the EPP’s electoral
manifesto for the ﬁrst European Parliament elections by direct universal
suffrage in 1979.
WERNER ’S MONETARY THINKING AND
POLITICAL ACTION IN THE 1960S
As ﬁnance minister and later prime minister, Werner was well aware of the
potential of the banking sector for the diversiﬁcation of an economy that
was entirely dominated by the steel industry. Luxembourg had several
distinguishing features which gave it a competitive advantage. They resulted
in part from action taken by the government and in part from various
external factors, including the interest equalization tax introduced in the
United States in 1963 and the German securities transfer tax (Kuponsteuer)
introduced in 1965. In particular, the absence of a central bank meant
that Luxembourg-based banking establishments were not obliged to set aside
compulsory minimum reserves. Furthermore, the dual Belgium–Luxembourg
exchange market, which was managed by the Institut belgo-luxembourgeois
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du change (the Belgium and Luxembourg Exchange Institute), created a
separation between commercial and ﬁnancial transactions and facilitated
international activities. The supervisory authority, the Commissariat au con-
trôle des banques (Banking Control Commission or CCB), was a small
structure, with a dynamic decision-making process and a Commissioner
with extensive powers, making it particularly responsive to opportunities as
they arose.
Finally, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) in Luxembourg was followed by the relocation to the country of the
Community’s ﬁnancial institutions, including the European Investment
Bank (EIB), which established its headquarters there in 1968. Their presence
gave the Luxembourg ﬁnancial centre a European dimension, placing it in a
strong position to become an ‘incubator’ for monetary integration. The
monetary association with Belgium meant that Luxembourg had only a
‘virtual monetary authority’, exercised by the CCB. However, this did not
stop the country from playing an active role in international monetary
debates, with its representatives regularly invited to participate, alongside
the experts of National Bank of Belgium, in the Basel Committee of Banking
Supervision and the Group of Ten.
The proactive policy of the successive Werner governments in the decade
from 1960 to 1970 led to the development and specialization of Luxembourg’s
international ﬁnancial centre. It became a pillar of the economy and served as
a ‘laboratory’ for a common European currency. In 1959 the ﬁrst US bank
opened in Luxembourg as Crédit Européen, followed by the ﬁrst Luxembourg
investment fund, Eurunion. In 1961, the Luxembourg stock exchange became
a founding member of the International Federation of Stock Exchanges. In
1965, the legal status of ‘ﬁnancial holding company’ was created to attract
long-term capital by eliminating double taxation. In 1967, the ﬁrst branches of
German, Swiss, and Portuguese banks arrived in Luxembourg. Subsequently,
in 1969 Werner set up an informal think-tank on the ﬁnancial centre, includ-
ing Trifﬁn, Jean Blondeel, Fernand Collin, Constant Franssens, Edmond
Israel, and Raymond Kirsch, to analyse future trends with a view to identifying
the prospects for Luxembourg within EMU.
Werner had a way of thinking about economic and monetary affairs which
was quite his own and was built up from personal ideas and the contributions
of others. He was inspired by the unique situation of Luxembourg, a country
which did not have its own central bank or national currency and had
therefore always favoured currency unions.
In the lecture ‘What Monetary Integration Means’ (‘Signiﬁcations d’une
intégration monétaire’), Werner (1960) set out his ﬁrst thoughts on European
monetary integration. Evoking the lessons learned from the Benelux Union,
which was based on a monetary agreement, he stressed that economic cooper-
ation and integration come about more directly through the instrument of
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monetary policy, ‘but that unilateral and therefore brutal decisions were not
desirable’:
Between sovereign countries, monetary rapprochement can only be gradual and
concomitant with the rapprochement of economic policies . . . and monetary
uniﬁcation comes at the end rather than the beginning of the integration process.
(Werner 1960: 4)
A common market required not just a ﬁnancial order within the EEC but a
ﬁnancial order on a broader continental or world scale. At the same time, with
respect to the ﬁnancial order of the EEC, it was not enough for it to join a
broader monetary system: ‘a stronger Community slant should be given to
their ﬁnancial policies’. Werner proposed the progressive introduction of a
European currency of account capable of lessening the risks caused by
speculative movements of capital. In the EEC’s international relations, this
European currency ‘would supply a benchmark for value shielded from ups
and downs in the national currencies, facilitate the expansion of international
trade and encourage the development of savings’. Private use could be intro-
duced gradually to ‘accustom people, little by little, to this collective currency’
(Werner 1960: 10).
Werner was in tune with the ideas of Robert Trifﬁn, who looked ahead to a
gradual disintegration of the international monetary system and argued for
the setting up of a European monetary union. On this topic, Werner was in
contact with his Belgian opposite number, Pierre Wigny, and with Belgian
banker Fernand Collin. The latter, with whom Werner had had discussions
since 1956 on the subject of a European unit of account for private use,
was actively involved in setting up some of the special features of Luxembourg
as a ﬁnancial centre. At the instigation of ﬁnance minister Werner, the
Luxembourg ﬁnancial centre was the ﬁrst to issue international bonds denom-
inated in European units of account (EUAs). In January 1961, Kredietbank SA
Luxembourgeoise (KBL), of which Collin was president and Trifﬁn a member
of the board, issued the ﬁrst loan of 5 million EUAs to the Portuguese oil
company Sacor. A second followed in 1962. Paradoxically, these proto-
Eurobonds were never recognized. In July 1963, the ﬁrst Eurobonds were
listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange, in US dollars, for the Italian
motorway network Autostrade.
Although he was not yet a member of the Action Committee for the United
States of Europe, as early as the summer of 1961 Werner was in contact with
Monnet and was familiar with the Committee’s proposal for the establishment
of a European union of the monetary reserves of the Six EEC Member States.
Werner kept up to date with developments in economic and monetary
thinking, testing some of his ideas and initiatives in a wide range of settings.
Pride of place went to regular meetings with European heads of state and
government, especially when afﬁliation to Christian Democracy gave him an
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added kinship with them; to the discussions which took place within the BLEU
and the Benelux; and to the meetings of the EEC ﬁnance ministers, in which he
was involved for many years. He established relations of trust with his EEC
counterparts, particularly with Raymond Barre and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
in France, Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers in Belgium, Karl Schiller and
Franz Etzel in Germany, and Emilio Colombo in Italy; with central bank
governors including Baron Hubert Ansiaux in Belgium, Guido Carli in Italy,
Jelle Zijlstra in the Netherlands, Bernard Clappier in France, and Karl Blessing
in Germany; and with other bankers, especially Collin and Abs of the
Deutsche Bank. They held regular exchanges over a long period. Werner
enjoyed very close relations with his Belgian and German partners. He also
had cordial relations with the British, especially with Edward Heath, taking a
close interest in Britain’s moves towards membership of the EEC and the
problems raised by the pound sterling in the context of a European monetary
identity. The good connections he had long maintained with US political and
business circles added the requisite global dimension to his views, especially as
regards the conclusions to be drawn from American economic liberalism and
the role of the dollar as both a national and an international currency.
In November 1962, Werner was the ﬁrst EEC head of government to react
favourably to the Action Programme for the Second Stage of the EEC, which
European Commissioner Robert Marjolin had presented one month earlier
(see Chapter 3 by Katja Seidel). In the lecture ‘Issues Relating to Financial
Integration in Europe’ (‘Problèmes de l’intégration ﬁnancière de l’Europe’),
Werner (1962) once again asserted the relevance of a European unit of
account, which he saw as a means of giving a kick-start to a European
monetary system. He emphasized the need for ﬁxed exchange rates and a
common monetary discipline and solidarity in a speciﬁc institutional frame-
work, that is to say a ‘monetary institute which could concomitantly develop
its role as a clearing house between the central banks’. Werner went on to
say that:
The method recommended here would enable monetary integration to proceed
along the lines of development of the Community’s tasks without impinging on
national responsibilities and without premature dispossession . . .The uniﬁcation
of economic policies will never be absolute: at speciﬁc times, short-term econom-
ic measures may be imposed in this or that country. (Werner 1962: 9)
It was only in 1964 that some of the European Commission’s recommenda-
tions in terms of monetary policy started to take practical shape, in particular
with the creation of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks
(CGCB), which was set up in June 1963, and the establishment of collabor-
ation between the Member States on international monetary relations in 1964.
They reﬂected a growing concern to make further progress in European
monetary integration.
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In 1965,Werner was the ﬁrst head of government, whilst president-in-ofﬁce
of the EEC Council, to emphasize the importance of monetary integration as
part of the Community’s internal and external policy. In an address given to
the European Parliament, he stressed ‘the need to set up . . . common monet-
ary procedures and . . . the need to enshrine ﬁxed exchange rates in a set of
monetary rules’ (Werner 1966b: 8). At the annual meeting of governors of the
IMF in 1966, he spoke as an ‘advocate for European monetary policy’ (Werner
1966a: 3).
In 1967–8, the turbulence in the international monetary system became
increasingly apparent. The idea of setting up an area of monetary stability in
Europe and thereby protecting the European economies from the upheavals
which the dismantling of the BrettonWoods system would cause began to gain
strength (Van Yperseele and Koeune 1988: 41). In these circumstances,Werner
used the Europaforum congress on 26 January 1968, alongside Jean Monnet
andWalter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission, to outline his
views of the ‘Prospects for Europe’s Financial and Monetary Policy’ (‘Perspec-
tives de la Politique Financière et Monétaire Européenne’) (Werner 1968a). He
set out a theoretical structure for the means and instruments of practical action
in an increasingly unpredictable international context. Six months before the
entry into force of the Customs Union between the EEC Member States,
Werner put forward a roadmap to European monetary integration.
His action plan was based on ﬁve pillars: the creation of a European unit of
account, prior consultation between national authorities, ﬁxed exchange rates
between the Member States, internal and external solidarity (particularly
within the IMF), and the creation of a Community reserve fund. He empha-
sized the consequences of liberalizing capital ﬂows and of the development of
the Euromarkets, subjects that he had been able to analyse within the Luxem-
bourg ﬁnancial centre. His address foreshadowed the main theme of the ﬁrst
Barre memorandum, which the EC Commission published the following
month (see Chapter 4 by David Howarth). However, the memorandum did
not refer to the monetary union and the reserve fund that had been recom-
mended by Trifﬁn, the Monnet Action Committee, and Werner.
Throughout 1968, Werner played an increasingly active role in Monnet’s
Action Committee for the United States of Europe and enjoyed fruitful
exchanges with Monnet, Trifﬁn, and Carli. The governor of the Banca d’Italia
praised the pioneering nature of this ‘ﬁrst Werner Plan’ and circulated it in
international ﬁnancial circles and within the CGCB. The German economics
minister, Karl Schiller, wanted to see the Community progress in the direction
sketched out by Werner.2 The Benelux ﬁnance ministers were also particularly
2 Letter from Karl Schiller to Pierre Werner (Bonn, 23 February 1968), BArch B 102,
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs)/93454, Pierre Werner
family archives (PWLux).
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interested in the plan, as was the Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN
1968b). When Werner presented his ideas at the meeting held on 9 and 10
September 1968 in Rotterdam, he emphasized the two fundamental principles
that underpinned his approach: the political commitment of the Six as a basis
for monetary uniﬁcation, and the parallel and balanced movement between
the coordination of economic policies and monetary integration.
Monetary solidarity will only be established laboriously in line with the strength-
ening of economic policy, and is dependent on it. On the other hand, the
establishment of legal procedures and instruments directed towards a common
monetary policy will be a powerful lever for bringing national economies closer
together. (Werner 1968c: 5)
However, in order to defend the Luxembourg ﬁnancial centre, and in his role
as prime minister, Werner moved away from this middle line in his political
action, choosing instead to adopt a resolutely ‘monetarist’ approach. French
foreign minister Michel Debré made a point of emphasizing that: ‘Werner [is]
the Luxembourger who, behind sweeping declarations of principle and lofty
views, strictly defends the speciﬁc interests of Luxembourg’ (Debré 1988: 398).
Werner saw his approach as justiﬁed by the difﬁculties experienced ﬁrst by the
pound sterling and then by the French franc. These difﬁculties led ECOFIN to
put monetary questions at the forefront of the European integration process.
THE CONSTITUTION AND WORK
OF THE WERNER COMMITTEE
The Hague Summit of 1 and 2 December 1969 took place under the auspices
of the ‘completion, enlargement, deepening’ triptych of the EEC. Regarding
the ‘deepening’ of the Community, two aspects stood out: economic and
monetary cooperation and political cooperation. As Raymond Barre put it:
This decision by the Heads of State and Government . . .was the outcome of an
agreement between Mr Pompidou and the German Chancellor Mr Willy Brandt,
and Mr Monnet, whom I had seen before the summit. He had told me that he was
intervening personally to ensure that the monetary question would be raised at
the summit. (Bitsch et al. 2004: 16)
The six EECheads of state and government agreed that a plan by stages should be
drawn up by the Council in 1970 for the establishment of an economic and
monetary union. An ad hoc committee would be set up for this purpose. They
also decided ‘to arrange for the investigation of the possibility of setting up a
European reserve fund in which a joint economic and monetary policy would
have to result’ (EC 1969: 13). The proposal on the ERF, which Monnet asked
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Trifﬁn to draw up, was sent to Brandt, an active member of the Action Com-
mittee for the United States of Europe, who presented it at the Hague Summit.
The ﬁnal agreement reﬂected the differences of approaches between the
various representatives and foreshadowed the later clashes between the French
and the Germans. While Brandt considered the effective harmonization of
economic policies to be a prerequisite for the establishment of the ERF,
Pompidou insisted on the introduction of a system for balance of payments
assistance and a monetary union between the Six which would consolidate
their position on the international stage.
On 6 March 1970, the EC Council decided on the composition of the ad hoc
group. There were three main reasons for the choice of members. First,
responsibility for examining the issues raised by the Hague Summit had to
be in the hands of ofﬁcials in charge of economic and ﬁnancial policy in the
Member States. Second, the ﬁgures concerned had to have a special commit-
ment and considerable experience in European integration. Lastly, any
solution put forward had to have the widest possible support at government
level. The group was formed of the leaders of the various specialized commit-
tees of the EEC, who also held high national ofﬁces. They were the chairs of the
EEC Monetary Committee (Bernard Clappier, deputy governor of the Banque
de France); of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks (Hubert
Ansiaux, governor of the National Bank of Belgium); of the Medium-Term
Economic Policy Committee (Johann Schöllhorn, state secretary in the German
federal economics ministry); of the Anti-Cyclical Policy Committee (Gerard
Brouwers, state secretary in the Dutch economics ministry); and of the
Budgetary Committee (Gaetano Stammati, treasurer-general in the Italian
ministry of the treasury). The Commission was represented by the director-
general for economic affairs (DG II), Ugo Mosca. When the committee
members chose their deputies, Schöllhorn turned to Hans Tietmeyer, an
ofﬁcial in the federal economics ministry with responsibility for the Common
Market, and Ansiaux to Jacques Mertens de Wilmars, economic adviser to the
National Bank of Belgium (see Chapter 7 by Kenneth Dyson).
The experts were supposed to exercise their role on the committee in an
individual capacity and in full independence. However, their behaviour
increasingly reﬂected the positions of their governments. The composition
of the group was such that Luxembourg was the only one of the Six not to be
represented. The initial idea was for the committee to be jointly chaired by
Luxembourg and the European Commission, and a Franco-German proposal
put forward the name of Clappier as representative of the Commission.
Clappier suggested that he should withdraw in favour of Ansiaux. It was at
this point that Werner’s name was put forward by Barre, who proposed that
Luxembourg should chair the committee on its own. Baron Snoy on behalf of
Belgium launched the ofﬁcial proposal, drafted and published the diplomatic
document, and worked to secure the agreement of the three partners. But it
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/7/2016, SPi
104 Elena Danescu
was thanks to Karl Schiller, who managed to bypass the double-dealing by
France and bring the Netherlands on board, that the initiative came to fruition
(Danescu 2012b).
Werner’s appointment as chair of the group was not just a highly political
choice but a considered act in favour of a man with a strong reputation for
forging a consensus. At the same time his ‘monetarist’ approach and his close
involvement in the group’s work gave rise to reservations. Ultimately, even
those who had previously harboured reservations now came out in support of
Werner. At the Council meeting, the Dutch prime minister, Joseph Luns,
stated: ‘I regard [this] proposal that the prime minister of Luxembourg be
invited to assume the chairmanship of the ad hoc group as very timely, since,
aside from his many other qualities, Mr Werner has had a great deal of quite
speciﬁc experience in this ﬁeld; what is more, the importance of the ofﬁce
which he holds will make a deﬁnite contribution to the work of the group.’3
The ad hoc group held a preliminary meeting in Luxembourg on 11 March
1970 and started its work on 20 March, again in Luxembourg. The main
purpose of these ﬁrst meetings was to approve the working method. It was
agreed that there would be a quorum if at least ﬁve of the seven members were
present. Decisions would be taken by simple majority. The group would do its
best to present unanimous conclusions. Discussions were considered to be
conﬁdential and would only be minuted brieﬂy. The experts decided to deliver
a preliminary report by the end of May and to conclude their work by the end
of July 1970. These early debates brought out the fundamental thinking of the
committee. Priority issues were the pooling of the Six’s reserves and the
establishment of a Community central bank. The experts adopted a three-
point analysis: a description of the starting point, the ﬁnal goal, and the
alternative routes that could be followed in carrying out the plan. They
decided to focus on deﬁning the ﬁrst stage of EMU.
The task of drafting the report was delegated to the assistants, who met on
6 and 8 May under the chairmanship of the Belgian central banker Mertens de
Wilmars. On 11 May their draft was ready and on 20 May the committee
ﬁnally managed to reach agreement on a joint position. Werner presented the
interim report to the ECOFIN meeting on 29 May in Venice, stressing that
further work needed to be done on certain priority areas and emphasizing the
need to achieve parallel progress in the monetary and economic ﬁelds. On
9 June in Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers approved the interim report
and agreed that the committee should continue its work.
The deepening of the Werner Committee’s work was carried out between
June and October 1970. The preliminary draft of the ﬁnal report was reworked
in a select group including Tietmeyer, Looijen, Bloch-Lainé, and Mosca. The
3 Proceedings of the 105th session of the Council of 6 March 1970, reel No 2385, direction
1—OJ 8 and 12, p. 2/Pierre Werner family archives (PWLux).
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Werner Committee concluded that the establishment of EMU must be
embarked on in an evolving, gradual manner, building on the measures
already adopted to enhance the coordination of economic policies and
monetary cooperation. While aware of the need for economic and monetary
policies to be developed centrally, the committee stated straight away that it
was not in a position to make proposals regarding political structures. The
subsequent criticism of the ﬁnal Werner Report for its failure to offer a
detailed analysis of the architecture of the Community institutions has to be
seen against the background of the initial decision of the group to remove
this matter from the scope of its reﬂections.
On 7 October, the ‘plan by stages for the establishment of EMU’ was
approved following a last-minute compromise. The next day, Werner pre-
sented it publicly in Luxembourg. Of the fourteen ofﬁcial meetings of the
committee held from March to October 1970, nine took place in Luxembourg
(consolidating its reputation as a permanent capital of the Communities),
three in Brussels, one in Paris, one in Rome, and one in Copenhagen on the
sidelines of the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank (Danescu
2012c). The Werner Committee met for the ﬁnal time in this conﬁguration at
the Council of Ministers on 8 February 1971.
On 29 October, the EC Commission published its own proposals which
were inspired by the report. Although they had similar aims, the proposals
reﬂected different views. The German government voiced its dissatisfaction
with the Commission’s proposals, which were considered to be too limited and
not to go far enough. More ominously still, the Werner Report elicited harsh
criticism from orthodox Gaullists because of its supranational elements.
Under pressure, the French government changed its policy, which led to the
proposals being ‘watered down’.
In line with the European Commission’s proposals, the Six adopted a
political resolution—albeit one with no legal force—on 22 March 1971,
committing them to establishing EMU. However, developments in the inter-
national monetary system and the decision by US President Richard Nixon on
15 August 1971 to suspend the convertibility of the US dollar into gold were to
thwart the shared ambition set out in the Werner Report, which had already
been weakened by the absence of any real political will.
SEEKING A BALANCED APPROACH BETWEEN
THE ECONOMISTS AND THE MONETARISTS
The placing of EMU on the EEC agenda catalysed different national visions of
European monetary integration (Gros and Thygesen 1998). In January and
February 1970 several governments provided the Werner Committee with
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their views on EMU: Belgium (the Snoy Plan), Germany (the Schiller Plan),
and Luxembourg, whose position, which was penned byWerner, was based on
his ﬁve-point plan from 1968 (Werner 1970a). In March, the European
Commission published the second Barre memorandum, which emphasized
the critical link between economic coordination and monetary solidarity.
When the European Commission compared the four documents, it deﬁned
two landmark positions: ﬁrst, the Luxembourg Plan, which took the most
purely monetarist approach, and second, the Schiller Plan, which put most
stress on the role of the measures to be undertaken in the various spheres of
economic policy.
Although all the partners agreed that the ultimate aim was to achieve EMU
in ten years, the ways of achieving this goal were a source of debate. From the
very start, the work of the Werner Committee was marked by the conﬂicting
approaches between ‘economists’ and ‘monetarists’. From the outset, the
Germans (Schöllhorn, assisted by Tietmeyer) and the Dutch (Brouwer) sup-
ported the position of the Schiller Plan, namely that prior convergence of
economic policies was imperative. The Belgians (Ansiaux) and the French
(Clappier) advocated the monetarist stance. The Italian position on EMU was
inﬂuenced by both economist and monetarist views and evolved over time
(Maes and Quaglia 2004). Luxembourg sided with the monetarists in its view
that the economy was driven by deliberate monetary decisions. The priority
was therefore for quick decisions on the margins for ﬂuctuation between
European currencies, concerted monetary action, and the establishment of a
European reserve fund.
Werner attempted to arrive at a common Benelux position. However, the
three ﬁnance ministers and governors of the central banks could not reach
agreement: the Dutch sided clearly with the German economists. The Belgians
came out in support of a currency equalization fund, to offset the ﬂoating
exchange rates which were increasingly in use. At the group’s second meeting
on 7 April, Ansiaux raised the question of a fund in reaction to Schöllhorn,
who ﬁrmly believed in the primacy of economic union. Werner appreciated
the Germans’ views in principle but saw them as ‘too severe and not measured
enough’. Although he agreed with Ansiaux, he was aware that the Member
States were not ready to abandon the ﬂoating exchange rate system in favour
of ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rates.
The interim report seemed to tip the scales in favour of the ‘economists’, as
was noted by Walter Hallstein who claimed that ‘in substance, the report
presents a compromise that tends towards the economists’ position’. In
response, Werner decided to work for a balanced solution (Werner 1989).
He started by asking the EEC governments to commit to ‘guaranteed parallel
development’ between economic cooperation and monetary coordination.
Although at its meeting on 8 and 9 June in Luxembourg, ECOFIN approved
this fundamental principle, the dispute between the two sides remained.
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Werner also made sure that the views of the ‘monetarists’ were taken into
account. On 12 June, he asked for an opinion from the CGCB on the
exchange-rate regime in the Community. The committee was of the view
that a European monetary cooperation fund should be established from the
ﬁrst stage of EMU. Werner shared this view. He ﬁrmly believed that a plan
which made no provision for any innovation on the monetary front in the ﬁrst
three years, and involved nothing but pushing forward procedures for har-
monizing economic and budgetary policies, without any monetary incentives
to support it, would very probably become bogged down in interminable
discussions at the Community level.
In the end, after heated debates into which everyone pitched, Werner
sought to avoid a failure by securing a subtle compromise which was accepted
unanimously. Speaking to the EEC foreign ministers on 26 October 1970 in
Luxembourg, Werner stressed:
I am happy to note that on all these aspects we forged a unanimous collective
view. Of course these joint replies do not reﬂect all the individual preferences of
the members of the group. But we do think that having looked at the question
from all sides, at long sessions where we compared a range of ideas, we have
succeeded in giving shape to the wish for proceeding in parallel on the measures
to be taken in the economic and ﬁnancial ﬁelds. What we aspired to do was, once
and for all, to break the vicious circle consisting of setting prior economic and
political conditions. We have tried to draw a line midway between the view that
monetary union is the crowning glory of European integration and the view that
would turn it into the virtually all-powerful engine driving integration. I think the
proposals are in line with the existing treaties, and that they do, precisely, ensure
that the objectives of the treaties will be achieved in full. Thus for stage one we can
go a great deal of the way without amending the treaties. However, there must be
a strong political will backing up this process all the time that it is being put into
effect. (Werner 1970b: 5)
THE WERNER REPORT: AN ADEQUATE
BLUEPRINT FOR EMU?
The Werner Report of 8 October 1970 offered a full deﬁnition of EMU, which
was to be established in three stages over a period of ten years (1971–80). The
ultimate aim was to achieve irreversible convertibility between the currencies
of the Member States, the complete liberalization of capital movements, the
irrevocable ﬁxing of exchange rates, and even potentially the replacement of
national currencies by a single currency as a natural and desirable further
development of monetary union. Monetary policy vis-à-vis the outside world
would be a matter for the Community. Only the ﬁrst three-year stage, due to
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begin on 1 January 1971 and loosely based on the ﬁrst Barre memorandum,
was clearly deﬁned. It should be noted that the characteristic feature of this
memorandum is a particular association of traditional German and French
concepts: ‘a French-inspired medium-term analysis was applied to the
German idea of economic convergence’ (Maes 1998b: 42).
The report emphasized the pursuit of common policies by the Member
States, the introduction of greater coordination of national budget policies
(centralization of the size and balance of national budgets and how they
should be funded), as well as the harmonization of ﬁscal policies (VAT and
excise duty rates) including taxation of capital, on which matter it called on
the CGCB to deﬁne the appropriate guidelines. The report stressed the need
to consult economic and social sectors before deﬁning the guidelines of
Community economic policy.
From an institutional viewpoint, the report called for the creation of two
new steering bodies: a ‘centre of decision for economic policy’, independent of
governments and placed under the democratic control of the European
Parliament, to be elected by universal suffrage; and a ‘Community system
for the central banks’. This system would be preceded by the establishment of
a European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), based on Trifﬁn’s pro-
posals but more limited in scope. EMU would serve as a ‘leaven’ for the
development of a political union without which, ultimately, it would not be
able to manage. This argument was prescient with respect to later criticisms of
the architecture of the Maastricht Treaty, especially in the wake of the post-
2008 Euro Area crisis.
The Werner Committee believed that these elements were indispensable for
a complete EMU. The union—as described in the report—represented the
minimum that had to be done and was a stage in a dynamic evolution that
would be shaped by the pressure of events and political will.
Two main principles underpinned the drafting of the Werner Report:
gradual realization of EMU by means of a step-by-step approach; and ‘parallel
movement in practice’ (Tietmeyer 1971, 2015; see also Chapter 7 by Kenneth
Dyson). This principle of parallelism applied in three areas: parallel movement
in progress towards economic policy convergence and the imposition of add-
itional monetary constraints; parallel movement in the imposition of monetary
constraints and the transfer of powers over economic policy to the Community;
and parallel movement in the development of Community powers and the
corresponding development of effective European institutions.
The Werner Report could have been the basis for a common response by
the then Member States of the EEC to the dramatic change that occurred in
the economic and monetary environment of theWestern world in the ﬁrst half
of the 1970s. But the implementation of the plan was de facto suspended, as
noted by the Marjolin Report of 8 March 1975 (see Chapter 3 by Katja Seidel).
The report did have some ‘intrinsic weaknesses’, including ‘insufﬁcient
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constraints on national policies, institutional ambiguities [from a monetary,
economic and ﬁscal viewpoint], inappropriate policy conception, [and] lack of
internal momentum’, which might explain its lack of success in the immediate
term (Baer and Padoa-Schioppa 1989: 57). It was based on a regime of ﬁxed
(but adjustable) parities, despite the obvious weakness of the Bretton Woods
system. Moreover, in its deﬁnition of the second and third stages of EMU, the
report provided only general indications and did not lay down a timeframe. It
was imprecise as to the deﬁnition of economic union and also relatively
sketchy when it came to institutional matters.
But could the Werner Group have acted any differently to reach unanimous
conclusions? The compromise was ﬁnely balanced. It provided for a ‘system of
central banks’ that would be responsible for monetary policy. However, it was
not speciﬁed that this system would be ‘independent’, as the Germans wanted.
At the same time, the ‘European monetary identity’ did include supranational
aspects, contrary to what the French preferred. The plan also adopted a
centralist approach, aiming to resolve the majority of doctrinal and constitu-
tional problems associated with EMU despite the seeming lack of compatibil-
ity between national sovereignty and the Community interest. The Werner
Report was at the vanguard, making it ‘operationally, institutionally and
politically incompatible with the constitutional realities of states and of the
treaty’ (Ghymers 2015: 198).
Nevertheless, the Werner Report became a blueprint for EMU in the
European Community, as the Delors Report and the Maastricht Treaty
would conﬁrm twenty years later. The Delors Committee started its deliber-
ations in September 1988 symbolically in Luxembourg with a thorough
analysis of the Werner Report. It thus became the yardstick by which the
feasibility and eventual success of the Delors Report would be measured (see
Chapter 7 by Kenneth Dyson). Werner and Delors both emphasized the
principles of progressive realization of EMU by stages and parallelism between
economic convergence and transfer of powers to the supranational level.
Moreover, their reports deﬁne monetary union in almost identical terms
(Werner 1990; Delors 1992), but in some respects the Werner Report goes
further and is more clear cut than the Delors Report. In its conclusions, the
Werner Report ﬁrmly states that:
B: Economic and monetary union means that the principal decisions of economic
policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that the necessary powers
will be transferred from the national plane to the Community plane . . .
D: On the institutional plane, in the ﬁnal stage, two Community organs are
indispensable: a centre of decision for economic policy and a Community system
for the central banks . . . (EC 1970b: 28)
Contrast this with the language of the new Article 3a inserted in the EEC
Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, which vaguely refers to ‘the
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adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of
Member States’ economic policies’ (Koeune 2015: 301). The main differences
reside in the manner in which the two committees addressed two fundamental
issues of EMU: namely, the design of the economic pillar of EMU and the
development of this pillar into a political union (Scheller 2015).
PIERRE WERNER AND THE WERNER REPORT
Werner’s private archives reveal that he made a major personal contribution
to the method and substance of the Werner Report. In the ﬁrst place, he
contributed the three-point method. On 11 March 1970, at the group’s
preliminary meeting, Werner proposed a three-point working method based
on a starting point, a ﬁnal goal, and alternative routes between them—a very
basic feature of the plan by stages. He drew his inspiration from the method
used for the establishment of the CommonMarket, as evident in his ﬁve-point
plan of 1968, which had been received with such enthusiasm. The Werner
Committee sided with this approach, and the Werner Report was developed
on this basis.
Werner also played a vital role in deepening the Werner Group’s work for
the ﬁnal report. At a meeting of EEC ﬁnance ministers on 29 May in Venice,
he emphasized the need for further work in six priority areas. They included
institutional aspects of EMU, instruments for the coordination of short-term
policy and economic policy in the medium term, and budgetary coordination
instruments.4 He based his suggestions on the view that economic union and
monetary union had to proceed gradually and in perfect tandem. Political
union was a longer-term objective, underlying the other two.
On the subject of exchange-rate rules, Werner speciﬁcally stipulated
that there should be ‘consultation with the governors of the central banks’.
Although the ﬁnance ministers were in agreement on many conclusions, there
were still differences of opinion, notably regarding the creation of an EEC
exchange equalization fund prior to a common reserve fund. Nevertheless, it
seemed essential to improve the coordination of the policies of intervention by
the central banks in the foreign-exchange market.
All these proposals of Werner were to appear in the Council decision on
furthering the work of the group and eventually in the ﬁnal report. Werner
also proposed ‘consulting social partners on any important monetary deci-
sion’, recommending that they should be associated with the development of
Community economic policy.
4 Handwritten note by Pierre Werner for his speech to the EEC Council of Ministers,
Luxembourg, 8–9 June 1970, PW047/Pierre Werner family archives (PWLux).
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In addition, Werner particularly favoured giving the CGCB a leading role in
EEC monetary integration and advocated the essential role of the EMCF in
promoting gradual convergence between different domestic monetary pol-
icies. In this respect, he may have been reassured by Ansiaux, the chair of the
CGCB, whom he knew well from their many years working together within
the Belgian–Luxembourg monetary union, and also by Clappier.5 Werner had
raised the idea of a European reserve fund as early as 1962, and in a more
sustained manner from May 1967. In his ﬁve-point plan from 1968, he
described the role and powers of such a fund, which would encourage ﬁnancial
solidarity and serve as an instrument to strengthen the coordination of
economic policies in the Community. His approach was decidedly ‘Trifﬁnian’.
However, the CGCB remained very cautious about the EMCF, which it saw
as a Trojan horse for political control over monetary policy that would put
central bank independence at risk. Its own technical study, the so-called
Ansiaux Report, therefore did not recommend its establishment. It concluded
that, once a Community system for the narrowing of the ﬂuctuation margins
between the Community currencies had been set up and was functioning
satisfactorily, the establishment of such a fund could be envisaged, subject to
prior progress towards convergence of economic policies and coordination
of monetary policies (James 2012). The EMCF was set up on 1 April 1973
but was reduced to a mere accounting tool for cooperation between the
central banks.
Werner also worked to further the external dimension of EMU which the
plan by stages entailed. From 1969 he was in regular contact with the US
Federal Reserve and political authorities and with American ﬁnancial circles,
particularly through the Luxembourg ﬁnancial centre. One idea that kept
coming up was the consolidation of the future monetary identity and solidar-
ity of Europe by ensuring that the Six spoke with one voice in international
ﬁnancial organizations, particularly in the IMF. Werner had several informal
meetings with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, managing director of the IMF, follow-
ing the discussions that Monnet had had with him, as well as with Arthur
Burns, chair of the US Federal Reserve Board. Washington had reservations
about the idea of a European monetary bloc, which would stand in the way of
increased ﬂexibility in the international monetary system and seemed to be
prompted by anti-American motives.
Last but not least, Werner was directly involved in the writing of the
English version of the report and its dissemination in the English-speaking
world, particularly in Britain. He held regular discussions with Edward Heath,
the British prime minister.
5 Letter of 24 April 1970 from the governor of the National Bank of Belgium, Baron Hubert
Ansiaux, to Pierre Werner, president of the Luxembourg government, with a conﬁdential annex
on a European exchange equalization fund, PW 047/Pierre Werner family archive (PWLux).
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MEDIATION AND NETWORK DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPING
A TWO-PILLAR APPROACH TO EMU
One of Werner’s key contributions was in mediating to bring the differing
points of view in the committee closer together and secure an agreement on
the interim report on 20 May 1970 and the ﬁnal report on 7 October 1970.
Thorny issues included the transfer of responsibility from the national to the
Community level without engendering lasting tension; short- and medium-
term economic policy; the necessity for the main decisions on monetary and
credit policy to be taken in common; and the need for real decision-making
power to be given to the Community bodies. The controversy between the
‘economists’ and the ‘monetarists’ was so marked that it was impossible to
reach any unanimous conclusions on these issues—a fundamental principle
for the group’s work.
The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was a strong pillar of
Werner’s network, and he kept in permanent contact with Trifﬁn and Mon-
net.6 He consulted them a great deal on the sources of inﬂuence into which he
must tap, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, the two Member States
most reluctant to agree to a common position on the ﬁnal report. Werner and
Monnet were close to Brandt, using this relationship to good effect;7 whilst the
approaches of Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian prime minister, and of Baron Snoy
to Johan Witteveen, the Dutch ﬁnance minister and deputy prime minister,
also helped to achieve the desired result.
Werner drew upon a wide range of political contacts to gain inﬂuence. He
negotiated a common position within the ECOFIN Council directly with
ﬁnance ministers Giscard d’Estaing and Schiller.8 He also called Clappier
and other members of the EEC Monetary Committee to mediate among the
Member States. Furthermore, Ansiaux asked Trifﬁn to exercise his good
ofﬁces by persuading German and Dutch ofﬁcials to agree to the parallelism
principle.9 Werner consulted central bankers, notably Ansiaux, Carli, Otmar
Emminger of the Bundesbank, and Zylstra, as well as Rinaldo Ossola from the
Banca d’Italia, chair of the Group of Ten.
6 ‘Groupe Werner: Antécédents, préparatifs et réunions 1968–1970’ [‘Werner Group: Ante-
cedents, preparations andmeetings 1968–1970’], PW 047/PierreWerner family archives (PWLux).
7 Letter from Jean Monnet to Pierre Werner (Paris, 26 May 1970), PW048/Pierre Werner
family archives (PWLux).
8 Letter from Karl Schiller to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr Willy
Brandt, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs (Bonn, 14 October 1970), BArch B 102,
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft/93463.
9 Letter from Baron Ansiaux, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium, to Professor Robert
Trifﬁn, Berkeley College, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (Brussels, 23 June 1970),
PW048/Pierre Werner family archives (PWLux).
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The result of an astute compromise, the Werner Report can be considered
as another ‘Luxembourg Compromise’, secured by Werner. From 1968 on-
wards, Werner was one of the ﬁrst to develop arguments in favour of the
‘parallelism principle’:
We can identify two schools of thought: one is of the view that the monetary
community will fall like a ripe fruit from the common policy tree . . . and one
maintains that the development of a real economic and stabilization policy will be
hindered by the absence of monetary uniﬁcation. I believe that the truth lies at the
midpoint between these two extremes. (Werner 1968c: 5–6)
In discharging his duties as chair of the group of experts, Werner chose to
remain neutral, advocating a parallel approach to economic cooperation and
monetary coordination as the underlying principle for the group’s reﬂections.
He adopted a median position in the dispute between the various trends in
monetary and economic thinking, between which it fell to him to arbitrate in
order to bring the work of the Werner Committee to a successful conclusion.
WERNER ’S CONTRIBUTION AND LEGACY
As prime minister and ﬁnance minister of Luxembourg over several decades,
Werner emerged to play a rare statesman-like role in the process of European
uniﬁcation in the second half of the twentieth century. He was all too aware
of the particular geopolitical and historical situation of his country. For
Luxembourg, adopting an outward orientation had always been a sine qua
non. Werner was convinced of the need to preserve national sovereignty and
vital interests by maintaining an international outlook. Accordingly, he
placed the process of European integration at the centre of Luxembourg
policy. Werner’s foresight and his pragmatic approach enabled him to
develop long-term strategies and focus on what was achievable. His political
method was based on three main principles: anticipation, innovation, and
consensus (Danescu 2015).
Werner can be considered as an architect of EMU for three main reasons.
First, he possessed considerable expertise as a policy-maker and was able to
translate this expertise into inﬂuence on agenda-setting and decision-making in
the development of EMU. Monetary policy was a major and sensitive bastion of
national sovereignty, and the Member States were unwilling to make conces-
sions. Werner was unanimously recognized as an ‘honest broker’ who helped to
generate momentum and forward movement. He forged this consensus-builder
reputation on three levels: the domestic level by promoting dialogue with
both sides of industry, the ‘social partners’, which led to the Luxembourg
model of social consultation; the regional level within the BLEU and the
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Benelux as a leading proponent of small-state diplomacy; and the EEC level,
above all in EMU. His name is closely linked with two key milestones in
European integration: the 1966 ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ which put an end
to the ‘empty-chair’ crisis and reconciled France with Europe; and the 1970
Werner Report which laid the foundations for the single European currency.
Alongside his key mediator role, Werner provided a vital contribution to the
substance of the plan in relation to both the parallelism principle and the
concept of stages.
Second, Werner contributed his own vision of EMU. From the early 1950s
onwards, Werner called for the establishment of a European monetary system
based on a unit of account, for both ofﬁcial and private usage, and on a
clearing house for central banks. He made monetary policy a pivotal part of
his government’s action. In addition, the burgeoning Luxembourg inter-
national ﬁnancial centre, which experienced major growth in the early
1960s, served as a vanguard for a European currency unit. As early as 1962,
Werner raised the idea of an EEC monetary cooperation fund, as the prelude
to a common monetary policy. In 1968, his ‘balanced monetarist’ approach
was evident when he delivered a clear roadmap to get to EMU and advocated
the idea of gradualism and ‘effective parallelism’ in European integration. For
Werner, economic union and monetary union had to work in perfect tandem,
with political union as the ultimate aim. In his view, social Europe and the
coordination of budgetary and monetary policies were intrinsic characteristics
of EMU.
Third, Werner developed a tradition of Luxembourg ‘network diplomacy’
and European integration leadership (Dyson 2015). He forged his ideas by
cultivating long-term productive exchanges of views with other instigators of
monetary innovation like Collin, Rueff, and Trifﬁn, as well as with ﬁnancial
technocrats like Ansiaux, Carli, Emminger, and Zijlstra. There was also a
notably strong Belgian dimension to these exchanges. In addition, Werner
remained in close contact with the Action Committee for the United States of
Europe, above all with Monnet, Brandt, Hallstein, and Marjolin. Although he
never claimed to be an academic expert, Werner exerted his inﬂuence at
various levels of Community decision-making and became a key ﬁgure in
intellectual debates between monetary elites and in the efforts to establish
consensual transnational guidelines on monetary matters.
Werner also served as mentor and leadership trend-setter for other leading
political ﬁgures in Luxembourg who later became active on EMU matters.
This process can be traced back to the time of Joseph Bech (prime minister
from 1953 to 1958 and one of the key ﬁgures of the Messina Conference) and,
besides Werner, included Gaston Thorn (prime minister from 1974 to 1979
and president of the European Commission from 1981 to 1985), Jacques
Santer (prime minister from 1984 to 1995 and president of the European
Commission from 1995 to 1999), and Jean-Claude Juncker, long-serving
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president of the Eurogroup (2004–13) and European Commission president
from 2014. Luxembourg political leaders proved masters of the art of political
consensus and the country was a rich source of ‘men of providence’ who were
able to help ﬁnd a way out of Europe’s successive impasses. The inﬂuential
nature of this leadership has given Luxembourg a role in the European
integration process that far outweighs the country’s socio-economic size.10
10 The author would like to express her gratitude to all those involved in this project,
especially Ph. Duvieusart, L. Frieden, J.-C. Juncker, J.-C. Koeune, J. Santer, A. Sapir,
H. Scheller, H. Tietmeyer, H. Werner and M.-A. Werner, the participants in the ESHET
(Lausanne), UACES (Leeds) and STOREP (Torino) conferences, as well as all those involved
in the ‘Architects of the Euro’ project, especially K. Dyson and I. Maes. Many thanks to S. Cooper
for her proofreading. The usual caveats apply.
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